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1 Introduction
The growing availability of ﬁrm-level data has contributed to the blooming of both theoretical and
empirical literatures that highlight ﬁrm heterogeneity as important for the understanding of interna-
tional trade. Since the initial empirical papers of Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999); Roberts and Tybout
(1997) and the theoretical models of Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003), a major focus in interna-
tional trade has been on the relationship between ﬁrm characteristics, most notably productivity, and
the ﬁrm participation in international trade. As a result a great deal of eﬀort has been devoted to
the investigation and understanding of diﬀerences between exporting and non-exporting ﬁrms. It was
only recently, however, that attention shifted to the diﬀerences existing among trading ﬁrms and to the
nature of their activities (Bernard et al.; 2010b; Ahn et al.; 2010; Antr` as and Costinot; 2010). These
papers point out that there exist both manufacturers that organize the production and distribution of
their goods abroad as well as intermediaries that specialize in distribution.
The present paper examines the extent to which intermediaries contribute to Italian exports. We in-
vestigate the role of intermediaries in exports and examine how they diﬀer from manufacturing ﬁrms. In
particular, we highlight the characteristics of the destination market that are associated with a greater
export role for intermediaries. We combine data on cross-border transactions from Italian custom
records with comprehensive information at the ﬁrm level, including employment, turnover and industry
classiﬁcation. Firms are assigned to 5-digit industries according to the main activity they report in the
Census of Business. Around one quarter of all exporters are intermediaries and they account for more
than ten percent of Italian exports. Intermediary exporters are smaller than manufacturing exporters in
terms of employment, sales and especially exports but they display higher sales per employee and com-
parable exports per employee. They also have higher industry diversiﬁcation relative to manufacturing
exporters, but are less geographically diversiﬁed.
The mere existence of intermediaries suggests that they overcome barriers to international trade
at a lower cost than manufacturers for some range of goods and for some countries. We investigate
the market characteristics that are associated with the presence of intermediaries. The volume of
exports of intermediaries is less aﬀected by geographic distance than that of manufacturers. Similarly,
intermediaries’ exports are also less aﬀected by ﬁxed costs such as market entry costs and quality of
governance in the country. Thus it would appear that the speciﬁc ‘technology’ available to intermediaries
enables them to better cope with higher, country-speciﬁc, ﬁxed costs.
In the following we discuss existing theories and empirical work on exporting intermediaries in
Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the ﬁrm and country level data. We then document diﬀerences
between manufacturers and intermediaries and their exporting behavior in Section 4, and in Section 5,
we investigate the impact of a set of country variables on the volume of exports for the two types of
ﬁrms. Section 6 concludes.
2Intermediaries in International Trade
2 Theoretical frameworks
Recent models of international trade emphasize the role that heterogeneity in productivity plays in
explaining the structure of international commerce. According to these models and a large quantity
of associated empirical work, more productive ﬁrms are more likely to engage in exporting and foreign
direct investment. While these frameworks have been extended to examine multiple destinations and
multiple products, they generally assume that trade occurs directly between producers in one country
and ﬁnal consumers in another and do not account for the activity of intermediary ﬁrms in trade.
Early theoretical work on the role of intermediaries in international trade, e.g Rauch and Watson
(2004) and more recently Petropoulou (2007), model international trade as an outcome of search and
networks. Several new papers in the theoretical literature on intermediaries in exporting have taken
a more technological perspective based on models of heterogeneous ﬁrms (Ahn et al.; 2010; Akerman;
2010; Felbermayr and Jung; 2009).
New models of trade, in particular Akerman (2010) and Ahn et al. (2010), extend the heterogeneous
ﬁrm trade model of Melitz (2003) by introducing an intermediation technology which allows wholesalers
to exploit economies of scope in exporting. While all active ﬁrms serve the domestic market, now
manufacturers have a choice of how to potentially serve a foreign market. Domestic manufacturing
ﬁrms are allowed to choose between direct exports to a consumer in the foreign market and the use of
an intermediary ﬁrm who controls the goods as they cross the international border.1
While the details of the models vary, the general framework is similar. Exporting directly incurs a
ﬁxed cost and a variable cost. Indirect exporting takes place through an intermediary ﬁrm, or using
intermediary ‘technology’. The intermediary is assumed to be able to lower the average ﬁxed cost per
good exported by pooling the country or industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of exporting across more than
one good. This choice means that a number of manufacturing ﬁrms may export indirectly through a
wholesaler, rather than managing their own distribution networks, by paying an intermediary ﬁxed cost,
which is smaller than their own ﬁxed cost of direct export. In this more realistic setting, ﬁrms choose
to serve the foreign market either directly or through domestically-based export intermediaries.
Firms sort according to productivity into diﬀerent export channels. As in the standard model of
Melitz (2003), the least productive ﬁrms serve only the domestic market while the most productive
ﬁrms can export directly by incurring the ﬁxed cost of export and trade costs. A third category of ﬁrms
chooses to export indirectly through wholesalers. This third group, which looks like non-exporters in
the data, includes some ﬁrms who would not have been exporters in the absence of intermediaries and
some ﬁrms who would be marginal exporters in the absence of intermediaries.
Analogous to Helpman et al. (2004), we can compare graphically the proﬁts generated by each type
1Blum et al. (2008) look the role of intermediaries largely from the perspective of the importing country while
Rauch and Watson (2004) discuss when intermediary ﬁrms actually take possession of the goods.












Figure 1: Proﬁts from domestic sales, indirect and direct exports
of activity for ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity.2 The two solid lines in Figure 1 depict proﬁts from the
domestic market (πd) and additional proﬁts for ﬁrms that export directly (πxd). The proﬁt functions
are increasing linear function of productivity (α) as more productive ﬁrms are able to charge a lower
price, capture a large market share and generate larger proﬁts. The intercept of the domestic curve is
smaller in absolute value than that of export because the ﬁxed costs that are incurred for selling on the
domestic market (fd) are lower than what a ﬁrm must pay to export directly abroad (fx). Moreover,
since there is a per unit variable cost of export, the slope of the proﬁt function for direct exports is
ﬂatter than the slope of the proﬁt function for domestic production. These relationships introduce two
productivity cut-oﬀs (αd and αx), that in turn indicate which ranges of productivity determine exit,
domestic sales only, or direct exports.
With the possibility of exporting through intermediaries, ﬁrms now have also an additional option
of using the intermediation ‘technology’ to export. By assumption the ﬁxed costs in the intermediation
2In this example we assume that the ﬁrm itself has access to the intermediation technology. Akerman (2010) models
intermediaries explicitly in a monopolistic competition setting. Intermediaries face ﬁxed costs of exporting that are
increasing in the number of varieties handled by the exporter and their variable costs per variety include tariﬀs and the
domestic price of the variety. Producing ﬁrms view intermediaries as identical to any other domestic consumer and thus
only face domestic ﬁxed costs of production. The resulting pictures and cutoﬀs are similar although his framework allows
for a richer set of predictions on the size and scope of intermediaries.
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technology are lower than the ﬁxed costs of direct exporting and are greater than or equal to the ﬁxed
costs of domestic sales; fi is between fd and fx in Figure 1. The degree to which the intermediation
ﬁxed costs are lower than those of direct exporting depends on the combination of country, industry
and country-variety ﬁxed costs of selling in the foreign market as discussed further below.
The dotted curve drawn in Figure 1 depicts proﬁts for ﬁrms that export indirectly (πi) through
an intermediary. If using an intermediary does not aﬀect the variable costs of exporting then all
manufacturers would employ the intermediation technology and export indirectly, πi (α) > πd (α) ∀α.
To allow for both direct and indirect exporting, the indirect exporter faces additional variable costs. In
Akerman (2010), the intermediary sets the export price of each variety as a standard mark-up over its
own marginal cost, where its marginal cost includes both variable trade costs and the domestic purchase
price of the variety, which is itself a mark-up over the variable cost of production.
The combination of lower ﬁxed costs and higher variable costs at intermediaries introduces a third
productivity cut-oﬀ, αi, which is the zero-proﬁt cutoﬀ for exporting through an intermediary.3 If
αd < αi < αx then there will be an equilibrium with ’pure’ domestic producers and both direct and
indirect exporting. Firms with productivity levels below αd earn negative proﬁts and exit the industry.
Firms with productivity levels between αd and αi, produce only for the domestic market. Firms with
productivity between αi and αxd, now can proﬁtably access the foreign market through wholesalers.
Finally, ﬁrms with productivity levels above αxd produce for the domestic market and export directly.
Note that the group of ﬁrms with indirect exports includes some ﬁrms with productivity too low to ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to export directly, αi ≤ α < αx and some ﬁrms of higher productivity that prefer indirect
to direct exporting, αx ≤ α < αxd.
A ﬁrm’s decision regarding the mode of export is determined by variable and ﬁxed trade costs,
which in turn also depends on country and product characteristics. The degree to which ﬁxed costs are
reduced using intermediaries depends on the nature of the ﬁxed cost, e.g. the combination of country,
industry and country-variety components. We can write the ﬁxed costs of direct exporting of variety
k in industry j to country c as
fx = fc + fj + fkc
where fc is a ﬁxed export cost common to all varieties exported to country c, fj is a ﬁxed export cost
common to all varieties in industry j regardless of the number of destinations, and fkc is a ﬁxed export
cost speciﬁc to the variety and country. The greater the share of idiosyncratic ﬁxed costs, fkc, in total
ﬁxed costs, fx, the lower the possibility for economies of scope and the lower the share of exports handled
by intermediaries. Both country and industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs allow for the possibility of indirect
exporting. Exporting intermediaries may arise because they are able to share the country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
3It is possible that no producer will choose to export through an intermediary if the increase in variable cost is suﬃciently
large.
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cost of exporting across many industries and varieties and/or they may exist because they are able to
spread industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs across varieties and destinations. Existing theoretical frameworks
typically ignore the possibility of industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs but it remains an empirical question as
to whether intermediaries are country- or industry-speciﬁc relative to direct exporters.
The simple framework provides some clear predictions for the variation of direct and indirect trade
across countries. To the extent that intermediaries solve only the country-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of ex-
porting, e.g. each variety exported faces indirect ﬁxed costs fi = fc n + fkc, where n is the number
of varieties handled by the intermediary, the diﬀerence between direct and indirect ﬁxed costs will be
increasing as country ﬁxed costs rise.
The role of variable trade costs is less clear-cut in these models. A rise in variable trade costs that
aﬀects both direct and indirect exporters such as tariﬀs or transportation costs, can increase, decrease
or leave unchanged the share of exports handled by intermediaries. In our empirical work we examine
the role of variable trade costs including distance and tariﬀs in determining the share of exports handled
by intermediaries.
2.1 Related empirical literature
Recent papers by Ahn et al. (2010), Akerman (2010) and Bernard et al. (2010b) examine various aspects
of intermediaries in exports for China, Sweden and the US respectively. None of the papers uses exactly
the same deﬁnition of an exporting intermediary so the results are not directly comparable to each other
or those presented below.4
Bernard et al. (2010b) document the role of intermediaries in US exports. They ﬁnd that 35 percent
of US exporters are wholesalers accounting for 10 percent of US exports by value. Their work emphasizes
the diﬀerences in the attributes between exporters of diﬀerent types. Among exporting ﬁrms, pure
wholesalers are much smaller than ‘producer-consumer’ ﬁrms in terms of employment, but only slightly
smaller in terms of exports per worker and domestic sales per worker.5 Other diﬀerences include the
types of products exported and the destinations served, wholesalers are more likely to export food-
related sectors and export to lower income countries.
Akerman (2010) reports slightly more exporting intermediaries than manufacturers and signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the two types of exporters. Intermediaries are smaller in terms of total turnover,
much smaller in terms of export value, but export more products and ship to more destinations.
Akerman (2010) regresses country-sector intermediary export shares on gravity variables and prox-
ies for country ﬁxed export costs. Intermediary export shares increase in distance and measures of ﬁxed
4Speciﬁcally, Ahn et al. (2010) deﬁne an intermediary as a ﬁrm with certain Chinese characters in its name, Akerman
(2010) uses the main activity of the ﬁrm and includes both wholesalers and retailers and Bernard et al. (2010b) distinguish
between pure wholesalers, pure retailers and two types of ﬁrms that mix manufacturing with wholesaling and retailing. As
discussed below we only consider ﬁrms with wholesaling as their main activity as intermediaries.
5‘Producer-consumer’ ﬁrms in Bernard et al. (2010b) include any ﬁrm with no reported employment in wholesaling or
retailing and thus include both manufacturers and other service ﬁrms.
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costs and fall with destination GDP.
In contrast with the other studies, Ahn et al. (2010) ﬁnd much higher exports per ﬁrm for inter-
mediaries than direct exporters as well as many more destinations and products and products per
destination. Regressions of product-country intermediary export shares on country characteristics show
positive relationships for distance, tariﬀs and a measure of ﬁxed costs and a negative relationship with
destination GDP.
3 Data
3.1 Firm level data
Our analysis of direct vs indirect modes of export is based upon two ﬁrm-level datasets collected by
the Italian statistical oﬃce (ISTAT), namely Statistiche del Commercio Estero (COE) and Archivio
Statistico Imprese Attive (ASIA).6 The COE dataset consists of all cross-border transactions performed
by Italian ﬁrms and it covers the period 1998-2003. COE includes the annual value of export transactions
of the ﬁrm disaggregated by destination countries.7 The data also record the number of 4-digit industries
that the ﬁrm has exported although the value of exports by industry are not available.8 The limitation
of the export data, speciﬁcally the lack of product-by-country exports at the ﬁrm level means that our
analysis is limited to an examination of the variation of exports across countries, both across and within
ﬁrms.
Using the unique identiﬁcation code of the ﬁrm, we link the ﬁrm-level export data to ISTAT’s archive
of active ﬁrms, ASIA. In ASIA, ﬁrms are classiﬁed according to their main activity, as identiﬁed by
ISTAT’s standard codes for sectoral classiﬁcation of business (5-digit ATECO). This information allows
us to distinguish between four broad categories of ﬁrms: manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and a
residual group including the remaining sectors.9 ASIA also contains information on ﬁrms’ operations
including the number of employees and total turnover. The combined dataset used for the analysis is
not a sample but rather includes all active ﬁrms.
6The database has been made available for work after careful screening to avoid disclosure of individual information.
The data were accessed at the ISTAT facilities in Rome.
7The total value of the ﬁrm-country transaction, recorded in euros, is broken down into ﬁve broad categories of goods,
Main Industrial Groupings, identiﬁed by EUROSTAT as energy, intermediate, capital, consumer durables and consumer
non-durables which based on the Nace Rev. 2 classiﬁcation, are deﬁned by the Commission regulation (EC) n.656/2007
of 14 June 2007. None of our results are sensitive to using these aggregate sector classiﬁcations.
8The 4-digit industries are classiﬁed according to the Classiﬁcazione dei Prodotti per Attivita’ Economica (CPATECO),
which is the statistical classiﬁcation of products by activity. The CPATECO corresponds up to the fourth digit to
the Classiﬁcazione delle Attivita’ Economiche (ATECO), which is the Italian classiﬁcation for economic activities that
corresponds, to a large extent, to the Eurostat NACE 1.1 taxonomy.
9In particular, we classify ﬁrms in sectors from 151 to 372 as manufacturers, and ﬁrms in sectors from 501 to 519 (with
the exclusion of 502 which concerns the activity of repair of motor vehicles) as wholesalers. Retailers are ﬁrms in sectors
521 to 527, and Others contains the remaining sectors.
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3.2 Country-level data
We complement the ﬁrm-level trade data with country characteristics including proxies for market size
and variable and ﬁxed trade costs.10 For market size we use total GDP from the World Bank World
Development Indicators database. Variable trade costs may be either due to policy barriers, such as
tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers, or related to the cost of moving goods across borders, such as trans-
portation costs. Following the large gravity literature we proxy transportation costs with geographic
distance calculated using the great circle formula (Mayer and Zignago; 2005). As a proxy for policy
barriers we use a measure of country-level import tariﬀs calculated as the HS6 product-country import
tariﬀs weighted by aggregate Italian exports at the HS6 product level. Tariﬀ data are taken from World
Integrated Trade System (WITS), and the data on Italian exports at the HS6 level are from the National
Statistical Oﬃce (www.coeweb.istat.it).11
As emphasized in the literature on ﬁrms and exporting (Roberts and Tybout; 1997; Melitz; 2003;
Bernard and Jensen; 2004; Bernard et al.; 2007; Eaton et al.; 2009), ﬁrms incur market-speciﬁc ﬁxed
entry costs in order to enter foreign markets. These ﬁxed costs can be related to the establishment
of a foreign distribution network, diﬃculties in enforcing contractual agreements, or the uncertainty of
dealing with foreign bureaucracies. We create two measures of country-level ﬁxed costs. To generate
a proxy for the market-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of exporting to a country, we use information from three
measures from the World Bank Doing Business dataset: number of documents for importing, cost of
importing and time to import (Djankov et al.; 2006). Given the high level of correlation between these
variables, in our multivariate regression analysis, we use the primary factor (Market Costs) derived from
principal component analysis as that factor accounts for most of the variance contained in the original
indicators (see Table A1 in Appendix).
Data on the contracting environment are available from a variety of sources, e.g. World Bank,
Heritage Foundation, and Transparency International. To proxy for institutional quality we use in-
formation from the six variables in the World Bank’sGovernance dataset (Kaufman et al.; 2009):Voice
and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Eﬀectiveness,
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. As these six measures are highly corre-
lated, we follow Bernard et al. (2010a) and use the primary factor obtained from principal component
analysis,Governance Indicator, as our proxy for country governance quality.12
10More details on the country-level variables are available in the Appendix.
11WITS contains the TRAINS database on bilateral tariﬀs at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) product
classiﬁcation for about 5000 products and 200 countries. TRAINS provides information on four diﬀerent type of tariﬀs:
Most-Favored National Tariﬀs (MFN), Preferential Tariﬀs (PRF), Bound Tariﬀs (BND), and the eﬀectively applied tariﬀs
(AHS). We use the AHS tariﬀ in our empirical analysis. The AHS tariﬀ is the MFN Applied tariﬀ, unless a preferential
tariﬀ exists.
12Table A2 in Appendix reports the results of the principal component analysis for the governance measures.
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3.3 Constructed country variables
Product and industry characteristics are expected to play a signiﬁcant role in determining the share
of trade exported by intermediaries. Due to data limitations our analysis considers only cross-country
variation in intermediary export shares. To examine the role of product and industry characteristics
we aggregate several product-level measures to the country level. The ﬁrst variable is a measure of
industry contract intensity developed by Nunn (2007) to measure the importance of relationship-speciﬁc
investment in intermediate inputs across industries. We concord Nunn’s original data, corresponding to
US I-O industries, to NAICS 2002.13 These product-level measures of relationship speciﬁcity are then
weighted by the share of Italian exports in the HS6 product-country to create a country-level measure
of relationship-speciﬁcity.
We also construct a country-level measure of the elasticity of substitution between varieties of
imported goods. The demand elasticities are estimated by Broda et al. (2006) and reported using the
ﬁrst three digits of the Harmonized System codes. We then compute the country-level export elasticity
that is a weighted average of the demand elasticities for each HS3 product. The weights are given by
the share of Italian exports in the HS3 product-country. The greater the export elasticity for a given
destination the more likely that the exports are homogeneous rather than diﬀerentiated.
The third product characteristic is timeliness. We proxy the timeliness of a product by the share
of value of that product that is exported by air. This information is provided by ISTAT-COEWEB
for 10 broad product categories (NST classiﬁcation). We convert the NST data to the HS product
classiﬁcation and construct a country-level timeliness index using the shares of Italian exports in the
HS6 product-country as weights.
These constructed variables suﬀer from the likely endogeneity of product-country export shares and
we recognize that a complete analysis of the role of product characteristics in direct versus indirect
export modes would require ﬁrm-product-country level exports.
4 Manufacturers and Intermediaries
The focus of the present work is to investigate the role of intermediaries in exports. In this section
we document the extent of Italian intermediary exports, highlighting important stylized facts about
intermediaries and showing how they diﬀer from manufacturing ﬁrms. Table 1 reports the total value
of exports and the relative share of four broad categories of ﬁrms: manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers,
and a residual group including the remaining sectors.
A preponderance of exports, more than 84 percent of the volume, is performed directly by manufac-
turing ﬁrms. Manufacturing exporters also represent more than 50 percent of exporting ﬁrms. However,
an increasing share of exports are conducted by the 27 percent of exporters that are wholesalers, rising
13See the Data Appendix for a description of the concordance procedure.
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from 9.4 percent in 1998 to 11 percent of Italian exports in 2003. These ﬁgures are in line with those
reported for the US in Bernard et al. (2010b) where wholesalers are 35 percent of exporting ﬁrms and
control just over 10 percent of US exports. As in other countries, retailers are relatively minor players
in exporting, accounting for less than one percent of exports by value. As a result we focus on the role
of wholesalers as export intermediaries and will use the two terms interchangeably. Second, we observe
that wholesalers are, relative to manufacturers, of smaller size. Imposing a 20 employee threshold on
the database dramatically reduces the share of wholesalers’ exports from 11.02 percent to 4.67 percent
in 2003.
While intermediaries account for just 11 percent of Italian exports in 2003, there is substantial
variation across countries. Intermediary export shares range from a low of 3 percent for Malaysia to a
high of 41 percent for Cameroon and Sri Lanka. At the bottom of the interquartile range are countries
such as Belgium, Norway, France, New Zealand and China with intermediary export shares close to 9
percent; at the top of the interquartile range, we ﬁnd Paraguay, Moldova, Malawi and Albania with
wholesaler export shares of 23 percent. Across destinations, intermediary export shares average 17
percent, suggesting that wholesalers are relatively more important in smaller markets.
4.1 Firm characteristics
In their work on US traders, Bernard et al. (2010b) ﬁnd not only that traders diﬀer from domestic ﬁrms,
but also that substantial heterogeneity exists between trading ﬁrms of diﬀerent “types”. Our results
complement and extend that analysis by comparing manufacturers and wholesalers along a number
of dimensions: employment, total sales, export volume, the number of destination countries and the
number of industries exported.
The top left panel of Figure 2 shows the distribution of employment for all wholesale and man-
ufacturing ﬁrms. The employment distribution for wholesalers clearly lies far to the left of that for
manufacturers. Overall intermediaries are much smaller in terms of number of employees. However,
when we proxy size with total sales (top right panel) the diﬀerence between the two distributions re-
mains but is greatly reduced. The diﬀerences between the panels implies that the sales per employee
ratio of wholesalers is much higher than that of manufacturers.14 In the bottom panels of Figure 2, we
show the size distributions for wholesale and manufacturing exporters. The relative ranking of the two
distributions is similar to that seen above although the distributions are shifted to the right as exporters
of both types are larger than purely domestic ﬁrms.
The ﬁgures are consistent with the idea that manufacturing ﬁrms are likely performing two activities,
the physical production of the goods and the intermediation of the goods to a downstream customer,
while wholesalers are only engaged in the latter activity. This distinction is important when attempting
to compare the exporting activities of wholesalers and manufacturers as the use of employment as
14We caution that sales per employee is not a good measure of ﬁrm productivity when comparing ﬁrms of diﬀerent types.




















































































































Size Distribution for Exporting firms
Figure 2: Empirical density of ﬁrm size in 2003 - All ﬁrms (Top) and Exporters (Bottom). Size is proxied
by (log) number of employees (Left) and by (log) sales (Right). Densities estimates are obtained using
the Epanenchnikov kernel with the bandwidth set using the optimal routine described in Silverman
(1986).
a proxy for ﬁrm size may yield misleading comparisons. A manufacturing ﬁrm with 100 employees
will typically have lower sales and exports that a wholesale ﬁrm with the same employment. As a
consequence, we employ both employment and total sales in our analysis.
Figure 3 displays the binned relation between the log of volume of export and the log of employ-
ment.15 The plot reports the (log) number of employees a ﬁrm needs, on average, to attain a certain
amount of exports. The plot conﬁrms that wholesalers require a smaller number of employees to attain
any given level of export volume.
To quantify the diﬀerences between manufacturers and wholesalers, we estimate the following cross-
15Binned plots allow for a succinct representation of the relation between two variables and avoid displaying clouds
of thousands of observations. Here data are binned in 15 classes according to their (log of) volume of export, and the
x-coordinate is the average of every bin. The y-coordinate is the average (log of) employment within that bin.







































Number of employees per level of export volume
Figure 3: Relation between number of employees and export volume, 2003. Data are binned in 15
classes according to their (log of) volume of export, and the x-coordinate is the average of every bin
(see text).
sectional OLS regression,




f ) + εf (1)
where ln(Yf) denotes the logarithm of either total sales, number of employees, or sales per employee
ratio. DW
f is a dummy variable taking value one for wholesaler and zero for manufacturer; DX
f is a
dummy indicating if a ﬁrm is an exporter; and (DW
f ∗DX
f ) is the interaction between the two dummies
and takes value one if a ﬁrm is a wholesaler exporter and zero otherwise. The results are presented in
Table 2.
As expected, manufacturers are on average larger than wholesalers, 0.094 log points (9.9 percent)
in terms of sales and 0.52 log points (68 percent) larger in terms of employment, β1 is negative and
signiﬁcant in both speciﬁcations. In contrast, sales per employee are substantially higher at wholesalers.
We also conﬁrm the now-standard results that manufacturing exporters are dramatically larger and have
higher sales per employee than their domestic counterparts, β2 is large, positive and signiﬁcant.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we provide the ﬁrst evidence that the selection of ﬁrms into exporting may
be working for wholesalers as well. Exporting wholesale ﬁrms have total sales 13.4 times larger than
non-exporting wholesalers and employ 2.7 times as many workers, β2 + β3 is positive and signiﬁcant.
Sales per employee at exporting intermediaries are 4.8 times higher than at non-exporters.
Looking at exports in rows 4 and 5 of Table 2, we ﬁnd that the value of exports at wholesalers is
also much smaller than that of manufacturing exporters but that this diﬀerence largely disappears when
considering exports per employee.
The regression results of Table 2 conﬁrm the conclusions from the relative distributional plots in
Figure 2. In particular, the evidence on higher sales per employee, especially at exporters, supports
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the idea of wholesalers focusing on just the intermediation portion of the activities carried out by
manufacturers.
Recent work on ﬁrm-level exports has emphasized the extreme concentration of exports in a small
number of ﬁrms. Bernard et al. (2009) report that the top 5 percent of US exporters account for 93
percent of total US exports in 2000. Similarly, Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) ﬁnd concentrated exports
in a number of European countries including Germany, France, Hungary, and Norway in 2003. Table 3
reports the share of Italian export volume generated by diﬀerent size classes computed using export
value and deﬁned within each type. We ﬁnd that wholesalers exports are less concentrated among
large ﬁrms than are direct exports by manufacturers. The largest 5 percent of manufacturing exporters
account for 80.0 percent of total exports by Italian manufacturing ﬁrms, while the top 5 percent of
wholesale exporters account for 73.3 percent of Italian wholesaler exports. These ﬁgures are similar to
those reported for the US by Bernard et al. (2010b).
4.2 Industry and Geographic Diversity
The theoretical models discussed in Section 2 generally focus on the role of intermediaries in solv-
ing the ﬁxed cost problem for speciﬁc markets. In this section, we provide evidence on the presence
of intermediaries in markets and sectors. Figure 4 displays the relation between geographic and in-
dustry diversiﬁcation of the ﬁrm and its size, distinguishing between wholesalers and manufacturers.
Geographical diversiﬁcation is proxied by the Number of Countries of Export (NCE) and industry di-
versiﬁcation by the Number of Industries Exported (NIE); size is represented both by employment and
export volume.
The evidence in Figure 4 suggests that the wholesalers’ technology does not convey them an advan-
tage in terms of geographic diversiﬁcation, wholesalers export to fewer countries than do manufacturers
at similar levels of employment and exports.16 On the contrary, when considering the relation between
ﬁrm size and industry diversiﬁcation (bottom panel), we ﬁnd that at every size class wholesalers export
in more industries than manufacturers.
Considering only the sample of exporting ﬁrms, we investigate diﬀerences between manufacturers
and wholesalers in terms of industry and geographic diversiﬁcation. In Table 4 we regress the number of
industries exported and the number of destination markets (NIE and NCE, respectively) on a dummy
variable, DW
f , indicating if a ﬁrm is a wholesaler or a manufacturer,
Yf = c + γDW
f + εf if DX
f = 1  (2)
The ﬁrst row of Column 1 shows that, unconditionally, wholesale exporters export in fewer four-
16Ahn et al. (2010) report that Chinese intermediaries export to more products and to more countries than direct
exporters. However, as noted previously, intermediary export ﬁrms in the Chinese data are almost twice as large as direct
exporters in terms of total export volume.











































































































































































Industry Diversification and Export Volume
Figure 4: Relation between geographical diversiﬁcation (Top) and industry diversiﬁcation (Bottom) and
number of employees (left); export volume (right), 2003. Data are binned in 15 classes according to
their (log of) x variable, and the x-coordinate is the average of every bin (see text).
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Figure 5: Intermediary export share and gravity variables, 2003. Figures report the relationship between
intermediary export share and gravity variables: (Left) Real GDP; (Right) Geographic distance. Each
panel reports the coeﬃcient, b, of a country-level univariate regressions for intermediary export share.
Robust standard error is shown in parenthesis. Data are for 2003.
digit industries. However, including a control for ﬁrm size, either log employment or log export volume,
the coeﬃcient becomes positive and signiﬁcant; exporting intermediaries are active in a wider range
of industries compared to similarly-sized manufacturers. In contrast, intermediaries serve fewer export
markets even when adjusting for ﬁrm size. These results suggest that intermediaries are somewhat more
focused geographically and are able to overcome market-speciﬁc trade costs in order to export a wider
range of products.17
5 Exports by Intermediaries
The previous sections have shown that exporting wholesalers diﬀer from manufacturing exporters in
terms of in size, geographic coverage and the number of industries exported. In the following we inves-
tigate the relationship of aggregate and ﬁrm exports by intermediaries and manufacturers to country
characteristics including ﬁxed and variable trade costs.
5.1 Intermediary Export Share
We start by exploring the relationship between the overall intermediary export share by destination
market and the set of relevant explanatory variables (Figures 5-7). The correlation of intermediary
export shares by country with market size and distance is displayed in the two panels of Figure 5.
Wholesale export share is declining in log GDP, smaller markets have greater intermediary export
17A more detailed breakout of export value and exporting ﬁrms by type, number of destination countries and number
of exported industries is shown in Table A3 in the Industry and Country Appendix.
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Figure 6: Intermediary export share and country-level ﬁxed costs, 2003. Figures report the relation-
ship between intermediary export share and diﬀerent proxies for ﬁxed market entry costs: (Top Left)
Number of documents for importing; (Top Right) Cost of importing; (Bottom Left) Time to import;
(Bottom Right) Governance indicator. Each panel reports the coeﬃcient, b, of a country-level univariate
regressions for intermediary export share. Robust standard error is shown in parenthesis. Data are for
2003.
shares, consistent with the idea that in smaller destination markets ﬁxed entry costs have to be spread
over fewer units. In contrast there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between distance, a common
proxy for variable trade costs, and the intermediary export share.
We turn next to the role of country ﬁxed costs of trade, which are generally expected to be positively
related to intermediary trade shares. The two plots at the top and the one at the bottom left of Figure 6
display the relationship between the percentage of export volume that goes through intermediaries and
the three proxies for market-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs provided by the World Bank Doing Business: number
of documents for importing, cost of importing and time to import, respectively. As found by Ahn et al.
(2010) and Akerman (2010), these measures of market access costs are positively and signiﬁcantly related
to intermediary trade shares.
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Figure 7: Intermediary export share and product characteristics, 2003. Figures report the relationship
between intermediary export share and product measures aggregated to the country level: (Top Left)
Tariﬀ; (Top Right) Contractibility; (Bottom Left) Export elasticity; (Bottom Right) Mode of transport.
Each panel reports the coeﬃcient, b, of a country-level univariate regressions for intermediary export
share. Robust standard error is shown in parenthesis. Data are for 2003.
In the bottom right of Figure 6 we plot the intermediaries export share against the country Gover-
nance Indicator. The quality of country governance is negatively and signiﬁcantly related to interme-
diaries export share. This evidence supports the idea that as country-level ﬁxed costs increase, more
ﬁrms choose to use wholesalers to export.
The top left panel of Figure 7 investigates the role played by variable trade costs proxied by the
country-level import tariﬀ. The panel shows no signiﬁcant relationship between tariﬀ and intermediary
export share. As with distance, measures of variable trade costs are not systematically related to the
intermediary share.
Finally, we investigate the link between the aggregated product characteristics and intermediary
share. While the theoretical models remain largely silent on this aspect, we would expect that product-
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speciﬁc characteristics might also play a role in explaining the type of ﬁrm handling the exports.18 If
goods with higher relation-speciﬁcity face more inelastic demand, the share of direct exports is likely to
be higher for transactions involve products requiring relation-speciﬁc investments. On the contrary, the
indirect mode of export would prevail for homogeneous products such as commodities. This prediction
is in line with the hypothesis put forward by Peng and Ilinitch (2001) according to which “the higher
the commodity content of the product, the more likely that export intermediaries will be selected by
manufacturers”.
Transactions involving complex goods, whose production process is intensive in the use of highly
specialized and customized inputs, may require speciﬁc knowledge and tasks because of the eﬀort related
with the identiﬁcation of potential customers, more detailed contracts, post-sale service, etc. For those
goods the product-market component of ﬁxed costs is relatively large and such goods are more likely to
be exported directly by manufacturing ﬁrms. Figure 7 (plot on the top right) shows a strong negative and
signiﬁcant relationship between intermediary export share and the measure of relationship speciﬁcity.
In the bottom left of Figure 7 we ﬁnd that the measure of export elasticity is positive but not signiﬁcant.
Finally, we consider the share of each product-country export shipped by air freight. We expect
this variable to be negatively correlated with the percentage of indirect exports. Hummels (2007)
emphasizes that time in transit matter less for commodity-type goods or simple manufactures. These
types of products are thus more likely to be exported by intermediaries. Indeed, the higher is the
percentage of the volume exported by air-shipping, the lower should be the indirect mode of export.
In our regression the estimated coeﬃcient (Figure 7 bottom right) turns out to be negative but only
marginally signiﬁcant.
The overall message of these ﬁgures is consistent with the idea that there are a systematic relationship
between the relative volume of export managed by wholesalers and country characteristics. In the next
section we provide further evidence by comparing the relations of exports to country characteristics,
ﬁxed and variable trade costs for intermediaries and manufacturers.
5.2 Aggregate exports, number of exporters and average exports
As reported by Eaton et al. (2009) and Bernard et al. (2007) the extensive margin of trade dominates
the cross-country variation in exports. As such we examine not only the eﬀects of country characteristics
on aggregate exports for wholesalers and manufacturers but we consider also the impact on participation
as well as on the average shipments to a destination. Total exports to a destination can be decomposed
18While not discussed explicitly in his paper, Akerman (2010) models the price of exports by intermediaries as a double
mark-up over tariﬀ-adjusted marginal cost. Increases in the demand elasticity reduce the mark-ups and narrow the
diﬀerence between the export prices of intermediaries and those of direct exporters and increase the share of exports by
intermediaries.
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c is the log of total exports by ﬁrms of type i to country c, #firmsi
c is the number of
exporting ﬁrms of type i to country c, and avgXi
c is the average exports per exporting ﬁrm of type i to
country c, where i indicates either manufacturers or wholesalers.19
In Tables 5-7, we regress log exports and its two components on a dummy for whether or not the
exports are done directly by a manufacturer or by an intermediary, on country characteristics and a full
set of interactions,i
lnXi
c = c1 + δ1DW + β1Xc + γ1Xc ∗ DW + ε1
c (4)
ln#firmsi
c = c2 + δ2DW + β2Xc + γ2Xc ∗ DW + ε2
c (5)
lnavgXi
c = c3 + δ3DW + β3Xc + γ3Xc ∗ DW + ε3
c  (6)
Throughout robust standard errors are clustered by country.
Table 5 shows the results for aggregate export by type. Results for the two gravity variables, GDP
and distance in column (1), conﬁrm the typical ﬁndings that exports are higher to those countries
that have higher GDP and that are closer. Moreover, the results for GDP suggests that trade by
intermediaries is less sensitive to country size than exports by manufacturers. A one log point increase
in market size implies a 95 percent raise in manufacture exports, but only a 85 percent increase in
intermediary exports. The distance variable yields a surprising result. The interaction of wholesaler
type and distance has a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, suggesting that wholesale exports are more
sensitive to distance than direct exports.
In column (2) we add the measures of ﬁxed and variable trade costs. Higher ﬁxed costs of exporting,
proxied by the Market Costs measure, are negatively and signiﬁcantly related to log exports. The
coeﬃcient of the interaction with the intermediary dummy is positively and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level suggesting that intermediaries are less aﬀected by market-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs.
Aggregate direct exports are not signiﬁcantly related to country governance quality. However, the
interaction with the intermediary dummy is negative and signiﬁcant. Better country governance, and
thus lower ﬁxed costs, is associated with lower exports by wholesalers. These results conform closely to
the predictions that higher ﬁxed costs of serving a market make it more diﬃcult for direct exports and
more likely that trade will go through intermediaries. The tariﬀ measure is insigniﬁcant for both types
of trade.
19Bernard et al. (2007) introduce this type of decomposition and report gravity regressions on ﬁrm and product extensive
margins separately. Due to the lack of availability of product-level data in our dataset we consider only the ﬁrm extensive
margin.
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Column (3) of the Table reports a speciﬁcation with all the available country variables and the
aggregated product characteristics. As in the previous speciﬁcations, trade by intermediaries is less
sensitive to country size and ﬁxed costs proxied by Governance indicator. The market cost measure
retains its sign and magnitude but is no longer signiﬁcant. The two measures of variable trade costs,
distance and tariﬀs show no diﬀerence between direct and indirect exports.
We observe that product-speciﬁc characteristics enter diﬀerently for exports by wholesalers and
manufacturers. In particular, the higher is the relationship-speciﬁcity of the products exported to
a certain destination, the lower are the indirect exports. Moreover, the more homogeneous are the
products exported to a country, i.e. the higher is the export elasticity, the more likely that exports to
that country are handled by intermediaries. The mode of transport variable is negatively related to
direct exports but not statistically correlated with indirect exports.
All together these results emphasize the importance of both country and product characteristics in
explaining the aggregate exports for wholesalers and manufacturers and their diﬀerences.
In Tables 6 and 7, we report the same regressions for the number of exporting ﬁrms of type i to
country c and the average exports per exporting ﬁrm of type i to country c, respectively. The general
pattern of results is similar as that found for aggregate exports. As expected from the earlier work
of Bernard et al. (2007) and Mayer and Ottaviano (2008), the eﬀects of country characteristics are
strongest for the extensive margin of the number of ﬁrms exporting in the case of both manufacturers
and wholesalers. For the product-based variables, we ﬁnd that the intensive margin of trade reacts more
strongly than the extensive margin.20
5.2.1 Robustness
We report several additional speciﬁcations on aggregate country exports by ﬁrm type in Table 8 to
check for robustness. Column (1) repeats the regression including all the country characteristics from
Column (3) in Table 5. To get a sense of the economic signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients we report
in Column (2) the beta coeﬃcients from the baseline regression that represent the change in terms of
standard deviations in the dependent variable that result from a change of one standard deviation in an
independent variable (Wooldridge; 2008). The standardized coeﬃcients suggest that GDP and distance,
have a strong impact on the dependent variable. A one standard deviation increase in country’s GDP
raises the logarithm of aggregate exports by 0.64 standard deviations. A strong impact is observable
also for the relation-speciﬁcity variable.
The aggregate data for 2003 reveal that more than 55 percent of total Italian exports is directed to
European Union countries (EU15). To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by diﬀerences
between intra-EU and extra-EU destinations, we estimate our base speciﬁcation for extra-EU markets.
20Note however that the strong role for the product extensive margin (number of products exported) found in other
research suggests that average exports per ﬁrm may be responding largely to changes in the number of products exported
to each destination.
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Column (3) drops EU countries from the sample with no substantial changes to the results.
Some concerns may arise regarding the inclusion of multinationals in the analysis, as some of them
are classiﬁed as wholesalers in the Italian sectoral classiﬁcation of business. We run again our baseline
model excluding these ﬁrms in column (4). The sign and the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients are all
unchanged.
5.3 Firm exports and country characteristics
In this section we further investigate the role of market characteristics in the choice of the export mode,
by taking a ﬁrm level perspective.
We regress the (log) ﬁrm-country export value on country characteristics and interact each charac-
teristic with a dummy for whether or not the ﬁrm is an intermediary,
lnXfc = c + β1Xc + β2Xc ∗ DW
f + δf + εfc (7)
where Xfc is the value the exports of ﬁrm f to country c, Xc is a vector of market characteristics, and
DW
f is a dummy equaling one when the ﬁrm is a wholesaler and zero otherwise.
In Table 9, we estimate the equation controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, δf, allowing us to examine the
within-ﬁrm variation of exports separately for intermediaries and manufacturers. Results for the two
gravity variables, GDP and distance, in column (1) conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings that exports are higher to
those countries that are closer and have higher GDP. However, intermediary exporters are signiﬁcantly
less sensitive to these country characteristics than their manufacturing counterparts. Market size is
positively related to ﬁrm’s export volume, but the eﬀect is only half as strong for intermediaries as for
manufacturers. In contrast to the aggregate results, export values decrease as ﬁrms trade with more
distant markets, but less so for wholesalers. A one log point increase in distance implies a 21.0 percent
drop in manufacturer exports, but only a 14.1 percent decline for wholesaler exports.
Column (2) includes ﬁxed and variable trade costs. For the gravity variables, GDP and distance,
the sign and the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients is the same as in the bivariate speciﬁcation. Also
the magnitude of the coeﬃcients changes only slightly. The two proxies for market entry costs,Market
Costs and Governance Indicator, show even sharper diﬀerences between wholesalers and manufacturers.
Manufacturers export volumes do not appear to vary with market or administrative costs. On the
contrary for wholesalers there is a positive relationships between ﬁxed costs and export volumes. These
ﬁndings support the conjecture that the higher the ﬁxed costs of exporting to a given country, the more
likely that the operation is carried out by intermediaries.
Column (3) includes all the variables. Although the magnitudes of the various coeﬃcients have
changed with respect to other speciﬁcations, the overall message is unchanged. Export volume grows
with country GDP, but less so for wholesalers. Geographical distance and higher tariﬀs decrease exports
equally for manufacturers and wholesalers. Greater market ﬁxed costs, either higher market costs or
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weaker governance, are associated with higher exports by intermediaries. Firm level exports does not
seem to be much related to aggregated product variables
5.3.1 Robustness
We report several additional speciﬁcations in Table 10 to check for robustness. Column (1) repeats
the regression including all the country characteristics from Column (3) in Table 9. Column (2) drops
EU countries from the sample. Overall the results are quite similar with no changes in sign. The
governance indicator is larger and now is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with direct exports while
the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients on GDP and relationship speciﬁcity are smaller. In Column (3) we
drop all multinational ﬁrms from the sample. There are no substantial changes in sign, magnitude and
signiﬁcance from the baseline results.
6 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the relatively new literature on the role of intermediaries in international
trade. Using Italian ﬁrm-level data, we document signiﬁcant diﬀerences between exporters of diﬀerent
types and highlight the role of country-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs in the choice of direct versus indirect modes
of export.
Exporting intermediary ﬁrms are smaller than manufacturing exporters in terms of employment,
sales and exports but have higher sales per worker and comparable exports per worker. These diﬀerences
highlight the fact that direct manufacturing exporters are actually performing multiple activities, i.e.
production of the good and distribution of the good to the foreign market, while intermediaries only
perform the distribution activity.
Recent models of intermediaries in exporting focus on the role of ﬁxed and variable costs in the
determination of the relative importance of direct and indirect exports across countries. We ﬁnd that
intermediaries are more focused geographically and export a larger number of industries. This idea
that intermediaries are typically providing solutions to country-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs is conﬁrmed by the
empirical work. Measures of country ﬁxed costs are positively associated with intermediary exports
both in the aggregate and within ﬁrms. In contrast, proxies for variable trade costs are largely not
associated with diﬀerences between direct and indirect exports. Further research is needed on the eﬀect
of intermediaries on trade volumes, responses to aggregate shocks, and aggregate welfare.
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Table 1: Export volumes and Number of exporting ﬁrms: share by type of ﬁrms, 1998-2003
Year Total Exports Manuf Whol Retail Others
(billion) Share (%)
1998 213.61 87.07 9.41 0.58 2.93
1999 212.97 86.87 9.39 0.71 3.03
2000 249.18 85.08 9.71 0.76 4.44
2001 262.22 86.19 10.11 0.91 2.8
2002 264.03 84.46 11.13 0.89 3.52
2003 258.47 85.12 11.02 0.90 2.95
2003* 214.03 92.04 4.67 0.64 2.65
Year Exporters Manuf Whol Retail Others
(N. of ﬁrms) Share (%)
1998 170264 57.41 25.80 8.11 8.68
1999 169000 56.65 26.03 8.23 9.09
2000 175713 55.87 26.20 8.55 9.38
2001 176674 55.34 26.85 8.86 8.95
2002 180818 54.45 27.07 8.99 9.48
2003 181081 54.25 27.42 8.67 9.66
2003* 35244 76.55 12.30 3.48 7.68
Notes: Table reports the share of export volume and the share of exporters by type of ﬁrms (Manufacturers, Wholesalers,
Retailers and Others). 2003
∗ refers to 2003 for ﬁrms with more than 20 employees. Zeros are due to rounding.
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Table 2: Export premia, 2003
Dependent Variable DW DX DW · DX Observations R-squared
Ln (Sales) -0.094*** 2.599*** -0.006 985710 0.23
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
Ln (N.of employees) -0.520*** 1.415*** -0.422*** 1022424 0.29
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Ln (Sales/N.of employees) 0.435*** 1.174*** 0.399*** 985710 0.15
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Ln (Export) -0.925*** 147892 0.03
(0.014)
Ln (Export/N.of employees) 0.016 147892 0.001
(0.013)
Notes: Table reports OLS regression of noted characteristic on dummy for ﬁrm type (D
W), dummy for exporter (D
X),
and their interaction (D
W · D
X). Robust standard errors are reported below coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance
levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%). Data are for 2003.
Table 3: The Concentration of Exports, 2003
Exporting Firms
Manufacture Wholesale
Top 1% 57.3 46.5
Top 5% 80.0 73.3
Top 10% 89.1 84.8
Top 25% 97.2 95.7
Top 50% 99.6 99.2
Top 100% 100 100
Table reports the distribution of export value across ﬁrm-size percentile by ﬁrm type. Percentiles are computed on the
distribution of export value of each sector. Data are for 2003.
Table 4: Export premia: geographical and industry diversiﬁcation, 2003
Exporting ﬁrms
Industry diversiﬁcation Geographical Diversiﬁcation
DW DW
NIE -0.565*** NCE -3.871***
(0.026) (0.057)
NIE(c1) 0.837*** NCE (c1) -0.131***
(0.026) (0.053)
NIE(c2) 0.353*** NCE (c2) -1.522***
(0.023) (0.045)
Notes: Table reports OLS estimates (only for exporters) of industry (NIE) and geographical (NCE) diversiﬁcation on
dummy for ﬁrm type (D
W). (c1) denotes control for size as number of employees; (c2) denotes control for size as export
volume. The number of observations is 147892 for all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported below coeﬃcients.
Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p< 1%;**: p<5%; *: p<10%). Data are for 2003.
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Table 5: Aggregate export by type, 2003
Aggregate export by type and country (lnXi c)
(1) (2) (3)
DW 2.520*** 1.315 2.977***
(0.801) (0.974) (0.999)
Log (GDPc) 0.956*** 0.860*** 0.898***
(0.036) (0.042) (0.045)
DW -0.102*** -0.035 -0.055*
(0.032) (0.045) (0.031)
Log (Distancec) -1.046*** -1.026*** -0.931***
(0.068) (0.069) (0.081)
DW -0.232*** -0.277*** -0.078
(0.058) (0.062) (0.075)
























R-squared 0.88 0.90 0.91
Observations 330 330 330
Note: Table reports OLS regression of logarithm of aggregate export value by type and country. Robust standard errors clustered
at country level are reported in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *:
p<10%). Data are for 2003.
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Table 6: Number of ﬁrms by type, 2003
Number of ﬁrms by type and country (lnFi c)
(1) (2) (3)
DW 3.029*** 2.434*** 2.538***
(0.477) (0.542) (0.525)
Log (GDPc) 0.748*** 0.656*** 0.646***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.033)
DW -0.118*** -0.084*** -0.078***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.021)
Log (Distancec) -0.839*** -0.817*** -0.792***
(0.062) (0.061) (0.084)
DW -0.186*** -0.205*** -0.024
(0.030) (0.030) (0.043)
























R-squared 0.87 0.90 0.90
Observations 330 330 330
Note: Table reports OLS regression of logarithm of number of ﬁrms by type and country. Robust standard errors clustered at country
level are reported in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%). Data
are for 2003.
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Table 7: Average exports per ﬁrm by type, 2003
Average exports per ﬁrm by type and country (ln ˆ Xi c)
(1) (2) (3)
DW -0.511 -1.120 0.438
(0.701) (0.841) (0.950)
Log (GDPc) 0.208*** 0.204*** 0.252***
(0.031) (0.044) (0.040)
DW 0.015 0.049 0.024
(0.029) (0.040) (0.029)
Log (Distancec) -0.207*** -0.209*** -0.139**
(0.050) (0.057) (0.065)
DW -0.047 -0.072 -0.054
(0.055) (0.060) (0.079)
























R-squared 0.47 0.50 0.57
Observations 330 330 330
Note: Table reports OLS regression of logarithm of average exports per ﬁrm by type and country. Robust standard errors clustered
at country level are reported in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *:



































Table 8: Aggregate export by type (2003): robustness check
Aggregate export by type and country (lnXi c)
Baseline Beta Coeﬀ. Extra EU15 Without MNFs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DW 2.977*** 0.456*** 2.980*** 2.721***
(0.999) (0.153) (1.049) (0.965)
Log (GDPc) 0.898*** 0.642*** 0.908*** 0.902***
(0.045) (0.032) (0.050) (0.045)
DW -0.055* -0.195* -0.056* -0.054*
(0.031) (0.119) (0.031) (0.032)
Log (Distancec) -0.931*** -0.253*** -0.965*** -0.909***
(0.081) (0.022) (0.078) (0.086)
DW -0.078 -0.130 -0.121 -0.119
(0.075) (0.098) (0.077) (0.074)
Market Costsc -0.456*** -0.139*** -0.448*** -0.410***
(0.098) (0.030) (0.098) (0.100)
DW 0.113 0.024 0.110 0.059
(0.095) (0.021) (0.097) (0.103)
Governance Indicatorc -0.006 -0.002 0.058 0.041
(0.105) (0.032) (0.102) (0.111)
DW -0.229** -0.049** -0.243** -0.303**
(0.110) (0.024) (0.109) (0.119)
Tariﬀc 0.017 0.031 0.013 0.018
(0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013)
DW -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.008
(0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009)
Relation-Speciﬁcityc 0.714 0.027 0.787 -0.656
(1.308) (0.049) (1.323) (1.486)
DW -4.493*** -0.386*** -4.534*** -3.522***
(1.018) (0.087) (1.024) (1.201)
Log (Export Elasticityc) -0.155 -0.055 -0.144 -0.148
(0.124) (0.044) (0.123 (0.132)
DW 0.261** 0.135** 0.252** 0.261**
(0.108) (0.056) (0.107) (0.115)
Mode of Transportc -1.989** -0.093** -2.126** -2.048**
(0.855) (0.040) (0.871) (0.931)
DW 0.873 0.021 0.958 1.087
(0.628) (0.024) (0.643) (0.675)
R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.9 0.91
Observations 330 330 302 330
Note: Table reports OLS regression of logarithm of aggregate export value by type and country. Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parenthesis
below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%). Data are for 2003.
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Table 9: Firm exports and country characteristics, 2003
Firm’s export value by country
(1) (2) (3)
Log (GDPc) 0.368*** 0.388*** 0.402***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.026)
DW -0.185*** -0.158*** -0.165***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Log (Distancec) -0.337*** -0.341*** -0.299***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.046)
DW 0.133*** 0.103*** -0.015
(0.022) (0.023)
























R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.32
Observations 970685 970685 970685
N.of ﬁrms 146081 146081 146081
N.of clusters (countries) 165 165 165
Note: Table reports ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀect regression of logarithm of ﬁrm’s export value by country. Robust standard errors clustered
at country level are reported in parenthesis below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *:



































Table 10: Firm exports and country characteristics (2003): robustness check




Log (GDPc) 0.402*** 0.334*** 0.390***
(0.026) (0.019) (0.026)
DW -0.165*** -0.138*** -0.158***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014)
Log (Distancec) -0.299*** -0.289*** -0.289***
(0.046) (0.038) (0.046)
DW -0.015 -0.004 -0.016
(0.023) (0.021) (0.023)
Market Costsc 0.112 0.034 0.115
(0.077) (0.051) (0.077)
DW 0.049* 0.052** 0.027
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Governance Indicatorc -0.058 0.033 -0.068
(0.053) (0.038) (0.053)
DW -0.089*** -0.061** -0.086***
(0.027) (0.023) (0.026)
Tariﬀc -0.009** -0.006* -0.009**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
DW 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Relation-Speciﬁcityc -2.613*** -1.293*** -2.657***
(0.714) (0.475) (0.707)
DW 0.223 0.050 0.326
(0.376) (0.342) (0.372)
Log (Export Elasticityc) -0.019 -0.074* -0.026
(0.054) (0.044) (0.055)
DW 0.018 0.035 0.022
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Mode of Transportc 0.025 -0.012 0.101
(0.474) (0.395) (0.459)
DW 1.168*** 0.916*** 1.121***
(0.203) (0.194) (0.198)
R-squared 0.32 0.27 0.31
Observations 970685 586151 916126
N.of ﬁrms 146081 111321 143082
N.of clusters (countries) 165 151 165
Note: Table reports ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀect regression of logarithm of ﬁrm’s export value by country. Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in parenthesis
below the coeﬃcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%). Data are for 2003.
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Appendix
Data
As speciﬁed in Section 3.2 we complement the ﬁrm-level trade data with country characteristics including
proxies for market size and variable and ﬁxed trade costs.
To proxy transportation costs we use data on geographic distance taken from CEPII. Distances are
calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important
city (in terms of population) or of the oﬃcial capital.
As a proxy for policy barriers we use a measure of country-level import tariﬀs. Tariﬀ data are
taken from World Integrated Trade System (WITS), a project jointly developed by the World Bank
and UNCTAD. WITS contains the TRAINS database on bilateral tariﬀs at the six-digit level of the
Harmonized System (HS) product classiﬁcation for about 5000 products and 200 countries.
To generate a proxy for the market-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of exporting to a country, we use information
from the World Bank Doing Business (DB). The World Bank compiles procedural requirements for
importing a standardized cargo of goods by ocean transport. All documents needed by the exporters
and importers in each country to trade goods across the border are recorded, along with the time and
cost necessary for completion (for details, see Djankov et al.; 2006). For the purpose of our analysis we
use three variables: number of documents for importing includes all documents required per shipment
to import the goods from a given destination; cost of importing measures the fees levied on a 20-foot
container in US dollars; time to import reﬂects the number of days needed to import a container of
standard goods from a factory in the largest business city to a ship in the most accessible port. Data
are available from 2004 to 2010, while the last year of the Italian ﬁrm-level database is 2003. However,
given the low variability of these indicators, we take the average value over the available years.
In addition to country characteristics we examine the role of product and industry characteristics.
We aggregate several product-level measures to the country level.
The ﬁrst variable that we consider is a measure of industry contract intensity developed by Nunn
(2007) to measure the importance of relationship-speciﬁc investment in intermediate inputs across in-
dustries. Nunn’s data are classiﬁed according to the industry classiﬁcation of the US I-O table compiled
by the Bureau of Economic Activity. To match each I-O industry to an HS6 product, we follow several
steps. First, using information from Lawson et al. (2002) we construct a concordance between I-O in-
dustry classiﬁcation and NAICS1997 code. Second, we convert data from NAICS1997 to NAICS2002.
Finally, we exploit the concordance between Harmonize System Codes and NAICS Industries developed
by Pierce and Schott (2009) to obtain the information on contract intensity at the level of HS6 product.
These product-level measures of relationship speciﬁcity are then weighted by the share of Italian exports
in the HS6 product-country.
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Principal Components
Tables A1 and A2 present the principal component analysis (PCA) on standardized variables for Market
Costs and Governance Indicator, respectively.
Because principal component is intended to study correlation patterns, the analysis has to be based
on standardized variables to avoid confusion introduced by diﬀering variances among variables. In fact,
without standardization, the principal component method will favor the variables with large variances
at the expenses of those with smaller ones.
Results support what one might have expected. The upper parts of both Table A1 and A2 show
the total variance accounted by each factor. The Kaiser criterion suggests to retain those factors with
eigenvalues greater or equal one. In both cases there is only one factor that satisﬁes this criterion and
this factor explains respectively the 77 percent and the 86 percent of the sum of all observed variances.
The lower parts of the two tables reports the factor loadings, which are in the speciﬁc vocabulary of
factor analysis the parameters of the linear function that relates the observed variables and the factors
(here, only one factor is retained). The higher the load the more relevant in deﬁning the factor’s
dimensionality. According to Table A1, the loadings on Factor1 are relatively large for all the variables.
The same holds when looking at Table A2. Finally, uniqueness is the variance that is “unique” to the
variable and not shared with other variables. Again all variables, in both tables, seem to have a low
percentage of variance not accounted by other variables.
Table A1: PCA for Market Costs
Number of Obs. 180
Retained Factors 1





Standardized Variables Factor1 Loadings Uniqueness
Number of documents for importing 0.81 0.34
Cost of importing 0.87 0.23
Time to import 0.93 0.12
Industry and countries
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Table A2: PCA for Governance Indicator
Number of Obs. 193
Retained Factors 1








Standardized Variables Factor1 Loadings Uniqueness
Voice & Accountability 0.86 0.25
Political Stability 0.85 0.27
Government Eﬀectiveness 0.96 0.09
Regulatory Quality 0.95 0.1
Rule of low 0.98 0.05
Control of Corruption 0.96 0.09
Table A3: Industry and country extensive margins and the share of exports, 2003. Manufacturers vs. Wholesale
Manufacture
NCE
1-5 6-10 11-20 21+ Total
% of exporting ﬁrms
NIE
1-5 61.9 10.55 7.29 3.17 82.91
6-10 1.95 2.16 3.43 3.39 10.93
11-20 0.41 0.46 1.18 2.73 4.78
21+ 0.06 0.05 0.19 1.08 1.38
Total 64.32 13.22 12.09 10.37 100
% of export value
NIE
1-5 4.37 4.07 6.5 11.19 26.14
6-10 0.79 1.99 4.07 12.83 19.69
11-20 0.25 0.79 3.18 18.63 22.85
21+ 0.12 0.19 1.5 29.51 31.33
Total 5.53 7.05 15.26 72.17 100
Wholesale
NCE
1-5 6-10 11-20 21+ Total
% of exporting ﬁrms
NIE
1-5 75.49 6.79 2.83 0.81 85.92
6-10 3.8 2.02 1.76 0.82 8.4
11-20 1.54 0.86 0.95 0.77 4.11
21+ 0.62 0.28 0.28 0.4 1.57
Total 81.45 9.94 5.82 2.79 100
% of export value
NIE
1-5 19.45 9.78 12.46 7.67 49.35
6-10 3.54 2.87 4.49 8.31 19.21
11-20 2.69 2.41 3.39 7.36 15.85
21+ 2.21 1.93 3.11 8.34 15.59
Total 27.88 16.98 23.45 31.68 100
Data are for 2003.
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